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Abstract 
 
A low-income economy tends to start catching up to advanced economies by adopting 
available useful knowledge from foreign economies after it conducts a certain form of 
institutional change. I argue that this institutional change is the one which enforces 
international interactions mainly by promoting manufacturing exports. It is not 
necessarily just to open up the economy to international trade. The Northeast Asian 
economies need to further promote the diffusions of knowledge, but as they further catch 
up other advanced economies, it will be increasingly important to construct an institution 
that protects patents, intellectual properties, and other useful ideas, so that research and 
development activities are encouraged as a fundamental source of economic growth. An 
international market to trade the knowledge needs to be further developed. 
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1. Importance of Economic Institutions 
The theme of this year’s Northeast Asian Forum is the political, legal, economic and civil institutions for 
Asia’s long-term prosperity. This article focuses on an economic institution. I will take the term “economic 
institution” as a broad concept of any legal or political systems that determine how economic activities are 
conducted. In this section, I emphasize the importance of economic institutions by discussing cross-country 
data. I argue that once an economy experiences a certain form of institutional change, it starts to catch up 
advanced economies by adopting available useful knowledge from foreign economies. In Section 2, I take it 
a step further to show that some of the most critical institutions are those that enforce international 
interactions, especially in promoting manufacturing exports.  In Section 3, I provide the implications of the 
discussions so far on the Northeast Asian economies. 
Figure 1 is a duplicate of Figure 2.3 in Parente and Prescott (2000, p. 22), extended to more recent 
observations based on the data provided by Angus Maddison. The horizontal axis shows the cross-country 
observations on the initial years in which per-capita GDPs first reached $2,000 in 1990 constant purchasing-
power-parity dollars. The vertical axis shows the numbers of years taken for these per-capita GDPs to 
double to $4,000. For example, the United Kingdom (U.K.) is one of the first economies reached $2,000, in 
around year 1840, and it took about 50 years to double it. Among the Northeast Asian economies, Japan 
reached $2,000 in around 1930, and doubled it in 32 years. South Korea or Taiwan reached $2,000 in around 
1970, and doubled it in about 10 years. The Mainland China reached $2,000 in around 1990, and also 
doubled it in about 10 years. An obvious trend from the figure is that this doubling period has decreased 
over time. 
 
  
  3
Figure 1: Per-Capita GDP Doubling Years ($2,000→$4,000) 
 
 
This implies that the evolutions of per-capita GDPs can be depicted as in Figure 2. Advanced economies 
started their engines first. The economies such as the U.K. and Netherlands started to grow first, and the 
data suggest that their growth of per-capita GDPs was relatively stable at around 2% per year since then. 
Other economies hadn’t started their engines yet, but after a while, some economies began to emerge. They 
are late starters compared to the U.K. and Netherlands, but once their engines started, they tend to rapidly 
catch up the advanced economies, suggesting that there is a convergence of per-capita GDPs in this club. 
After such catch-up was completed, these emerging economies tended to grow with advanced economies at 
relatively similar speeds.  
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Figure 2: Stylized Growth of Per-Capita GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The descriptions so far suggest two important observations on economic growth. First, the main source of 
economic growth for low-income economies is potentially to use the knowledge that is already available to 
other advanced economies. The term “knowledge” here includes all ideas used to produce goods and 
services, including the technologies, know-how, patents, etc. As an economy starts the engine in a later year, 
there is a further gap from the advanced economies, and hence, there is a greater scope of knowledge 
acquisition from them. This explains why the doubling time has decreased over time. I cannot think of other 
explanations that are consistent with the observations in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The interpretation so far is 
consistent with Parente and Prescott (2000) and Lucas (2009). 
Second, once the engine starts, and hence an emerging economy reaches $2,000 in per-capita GDP, it 
continues to grow following a relatively common path that other emerging economies also followed. This is 
important for our Forum. To rephrase, there is an institutional change which starts the engine. Once this 
institutional change is made, then the economy tends to catch up with advanced economies. Of course, it 
would also possible that even after the engine has started, the economy can improve its engine (or institution) 
to speed up its growth. An obvious question is what sort of the institutional change starts and improves the 
engine, which I discuss in Section 2. 
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2. Which Institution Starts the Engine of Economic Growth? 
One can approach this question by observing the differences between the economies that have 
successfully started and maintained the engine and the economies that have not done so. Figure 3 is an 
extended version of a figure reported in Lucas (2009). It compares the initial per-capita GDPs in 1950 and 
the average annual growth of per-capita GDPs in 1950-2000 for selected economies. The data are provided 
by Angus Maddison. Part (A) compares Western European and Eastern European economies. A notable 
feature is that Western European economies have higher growth rates. More importantly, their per-capita 
GDPs converged. For example, Switzerland and the U.K. already had high per-capita GDPs in 1950, but 
since then, they grew relatively slowly compared to other Western European economies. This is because in 
1950, Switzerland and the U.K. already used much of the knowledge available at that time, and hence, it is 
more challenging to continue to find new knowledge to improve productivity. On the other hand, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain initially had low per-capita GDPs, but since then, they grew faster. This is because they 
interacted with other Western European economies to learn the knowledge, which is easier than discovering 
it on their own. These explanations are also consistent with Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
Part (B) is a counterpart figure for East Asian economies, and the interpretations are similar. One can 
observe a convergence of per-capita GDPs across Japan and the Four Asian Tigers – Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan and South Korea. The growth of per-capita GDPs in those economies is also higher than others. 
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Figure 3: 1950 Per-Capita Income vs. 1950-2000 Annual Growth of Per-Capita Income 
(A) Europe 
 
(B) East Asia 
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The discussions so far suggest that there are institutional differences between Western European and 
Eastern European economies, and between Japan plus the Four Asian Tigers and remaining East Asian 
economies, during the period of 1950-2000. The institutions of Western European economies and of Japan 
plus the Four Asian Tigers are likely to have facilitated international knowledge flows into them. A common 
feature of the institutions can be to encourage a participation in international trade on the basis of private 
competition. For example, Western European economies encouraged international trade, which eventually 
evolved into the European Union. Japan and the Four Asian Tigers, and the Mainland China since the 1980s 
as well, emphasized participation in international trade. A positive relationship between international trade 
and economic growth has been empirically documented by numerous studies including Sachs and Warner 
(1995), Frankel and Romer (1999), and Alcalá and Ciccone (2004). 
Why is international trade related to economic growth? A hypothesis is that the firms need to improve 
their productivity in order to survive in global markets which are more competitive. Alternatively, it may be 
that low-income economies are now able to import capital goods (such as electronic equipments), or 
purchase patents, trademarks, etc. from other economies. It may be that low-income economies can send 
students and trainees to advanced economies to learn the knowledge accumulated there, which is partly 
made possible by deeper international interactions encouraged by trade.  
I argue that the economic institution which makes the convergence of per-capita GDPs shown in Figure 3 
possible is not necessarily just to open the domestic market to foreigners, but to promote manufacturing 
exports more effectively. It is exports rather than imports since the global market provides a bigger league of 
competition in which domestic firms can improve the productivity in order to survive there. It is 
manufacturing rather than agriculture since manufacturing provides a greater scope of learning by doing -- 
improvements in productivity arising from producing more. The automobile industry of South Korea is an 
interesting example of the causality from manufacturing exports to growth. South Korea has become the 
fourth largest producer of automobiles as well as the sixth largest exporter, but its domestic market in 
automobiles had been protected for decades. South Korea’s productivity growth in automobiles is likely to 
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have been linked to a competition in the global market, not in its domestic market. 
Do the cross-country data support this causality from manufacturing exports to growth? Figure 4 is taken 
from Choi, Kim and Ma (2010). It plots manufacturing exports as shares of GDPs, and the real per-capita 
GDP growth rates for 128 economies in the period of 1975-2000. The trade data are obtained from the 
United Nations (UN) Commodity Trade Statistics Database (“Comtrade”).3 The GDP data are provided by 
Angus Maddison. The figure suggests a positive relationship between manufacturing exports and per-capita 
GDP growth. Figure 5 compares per-capita GDP growth in 1975-2000 of two groups of economies, each 
consisting of 64 economies, with higher and lower shares of manufacturing exports out of GDP. It shows 
that the economies with higher shares of manufacturing exports tend to grow faster, controlling for initial 
per-capita GDPs. Hence, Figure 4 and Figure 5 are consistent with the causality of interest. 
 
Figure 4: Manufacturing Exports as Shares of GDPs and Per-Capita GDP Growth, 1975-2000 
                                                           
3 The data for manufacturing exports and imports are obtained by aggregating Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) Revision 2 codes starting from 5 to 8, and a half of the one starting from 9. Data do not include Russia and Germany 
due to historical reasons. 
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Figure 5: Top Half vs. Bottom Half, 1975-2000 Manufacturing Exports as Shares of GDPs 
 
 
While Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate the correlations, the causality can be further supported by a more 
sophisticated statistical method called an instrumental-variable (IV) regression. Choi, Kim and Ma (2010) 
test whether the shares of five trade variables, (i) total trade, (ii) manufacturing exports, (iii) manufacturing 
imports, (iv) agricultural exports and (v) agricultural imports, as a share of GDP, cause per-capita GDP 
growth with the following regression equation: 
ሺygrowሻ୧ ൌ α ൅ ሺtradeሻ୧βଵ ൅ ሺiqualሻ୧βଶ ൅ ሺyiniሻ୧βଷ ൅ L୧βସ ൅ ε୧, 
for all economy i, where ሺygrowሻ୧ is the annual growth (%) of per-capita GDP over 1975-2000, and 
ሺtradeሻ୧ is the logarithm of one of the five trade shares over 1975-2000. Here, ሺiqualሻ୧ is a proxy of 
“traditional” institutional quality which is to be explained in detail below. Also, ሺyiniሻ୧ is the logarithm of 
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year-1974 level of per-capita real GDP, and L୧ is the logarithm of population on average of the period 
1975-2000. Assume ε୧ is independent and identically distributed with Nሺ0, σ²ሻ. 
In this equation, a proxy for “traditional” institutional quality is included as an explanatory variable. This 
is to control for the effects of other components of institutions traditionally accepted in the literature, 
reflecting the components such as government stability, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, 
militarized politics, protection from religious tensions, law and order, protection from ethnic tensions, 
democratic accountability, bureaucratic quality, etc., in order to study the effect of international trade more 
clearly. Following Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2005), this proxy is constructed as the sum of 
several indices using the dataset provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This proxy takes 
a value from 0 to 76 for each economy, where a higher score means lower risk. Notice that the proxy does 
not include a variable directly related to international trade. 
Now I discuss the instrumental variables. To control for the endogeneity regarding trade, I use the 
logarithm of trade share out of GDP predicted by the gravity equation, as suggested by Frankel and Romer 
(1996).4 This IV is correlated with all five trade shares. To control for the endogeneity regarding 
institutional quality, I use the distance from equator as an absolute value of the latitude, as in Hall and Jones 
(1999). Historically, this variable is correlated with institutional quality. It is less likely to be directly related 
to the growth rate. The data on distance from equator are obtained from Robert Hall.  
Table 1 summarizes the estimation results for OLS (ordinary-least-squares) and IV methods. First, the 
institution proxy is significant in most cases. Our concern is whether an additional dimension of institution, 
which is a system promoting international trade, is important. The slope for total trade is significant at 5% 
level for the OLS method, but not for the IV method. Manufacturing exports are significant at 5% level for 
                                                          
4 The dependent variable is the logarithm of bilateral trade between economies. Explanatory variables are geographic or 
populational, including logarithm of distance, logarithm of population, dummy variable indicating whether two economies 
use a common language, dummy variable indicating whether two economies share the border, logarithm of the sum of 
populations, and a dummy variable indicating the number of economies landlocked. The data in 1985 and 1993 are used for 
estimation. 
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both methods. The result implies that as the share of manufacturing exports increases by 20% (e.g, from 5% 
of GDP to 6%), annual per-capita GDP growth is raised by about 0.15% points (e.g, from 2.0% to 2.15%). 
Manufacturing imports are significant at 5% level for the OLS method, but not for the IV method. The 
slopes for agricultural exports and imports are negative or insignificant. The result also finds the 
convergence of per-capita GDPs across economies. The population size is also often significant at 5% level. 
     
Table 1: OLS and IV Regression Results 
(Dependent variable is annual per-capital GDP growth, 1975-2000. All trade variables as shares of GDPs.) 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Total Trade 1.12** 
(0.24) 
0.33 
(0.37) 
        
Manufacturing 
Exports 
  0.81** 
(0.12) 
0.63** 
(0.15) 
      
Manufacturing 
Imports 
    1.15** 
(0.23) 
0.45 
(0.31) 
    
Agricultural 
Exports 
      -0.08 
(0.20) 
-0.85** 
(0.22) 
  
Agricultural 
Imports 
        0.93** 
(0.20) 
0.42 
(0.24) 
Institutional 
Quality 
3.59** 
(1.04) 
3.88** 
(1.44) 
1.87* 
(1.01) 
2.24** 
(1.12) 
3.10** 
(1.03) 
3.62** 
(1.16) 
3.96** 
(1.17) 
2.88** 
(1.10) 
2.82** 
(1.06) 
3.44** 
(1.17) 
Initial Per-
Capita GDP 
-0.78** 
(0.19) 
-0.35** 
(0.19) 
-0.78** 
(0.16) 
-0.44** 
(0.17) 
-0.69** 
(0.17) 
-0.31 
(0.18) 
-0.32 
(0.20) 
-0.33 
(0.17) 
-0.51** 
(0.17) 
-0.26 
(0.19) 
Population 0.35** 
(0.11) 
0.27 
(0.17) 
0.19** 
(0.09) 
0.30** 
(0.10) 
0.38** 
(0.11) 
0.32** 
(0.16) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
-0.23 
(0.14) 
0.36** 
(0.10) 
0.32** 
(0.14) 
R2 0.28 0.15 0.39 0.27 0.30 0.16 0.15 0.24 0.27 0.17 
N 118 
Note: ** = Significant at 5% level. * = 10%. 
 
To conclude, an institution that promotes manufacturing exports tends to facilitate economic growth. This 
result is also consistent with Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007). This institution helps the firms to 
compete with foreign firms so that they can improve their productivity by learning by doing and/or by 
adopting the knowledge available in foreign economies. Again, this does not necessarily imply that an 
economy can just open up to international trade to grow faster, as shown in Table 1. For example, Young 
(1991) predicts that low-income economies continue to specialize in low-quality products which have less 
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scope of learning by doing. Hence, they are likely to lose from opening to international trade. An important 
aspect of institutional building for economic growth is to promote international competition, but domestic 
firms appear to need to be protected to some degree, at least at the beginning of this institutional building. I 
believe that South Korea’s automobile industry will not have been successful as now if its domestic market 
had been widely open to other automobile firms from Japan, the United States (U.S.), Germany, etc. 
 
3. Implications on North East Asia 
What do the discussions so far imply on the North East Asia? Figure 6 provides the paths of per-capita 
GDPs of North East Asian economies, while the U.S. per-capita GDP of each year is normalized to 100 for 
comparison purposes. It is widely accepted that the U.S. economy is relatively stable, growing its per-capita 
GDP about 2% per year on average after the World War II. In other words, this figure shows how North East 
Asian economies have caught up the U.S. economy in living standards. 
 
Figure 6: Per-Capita GDPs of North East Asian Economies (US=100) 
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Hong Kong’s per-capita GDP has fully caught up the U.S. level although there were some fluctuations in 
1990s. It is possible that Hong Kong might grow even further, in which case its living standard will be 
higher than the U.S. level. Japan grew up to about 75% of the U.S. per-capita GDP, but Japan’s per-capita 
GDP relative to the U.S. decreased since around 1990. At this point, it is not clear from which year Japan 
will further catch up the U.S. In fact, Taiwan and South Korea have almost caught up with Japan’s per-
capita, though both Taiwan and South Korea’s per-capita GDPs were only about 10% of the U.S. level in 
1950. As of 2008, it is about 60-70%. The four economies that we considered so far, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Taiwan and South Korea, are now considered developed economies by many standards. They already have 
relatively preferred economic institutions at least for economic growth.  
The per-capita GDP of Mainland China was roughly 5% of the U.S. level from 1950 to 1980. After that, it 
appears that China successfully conducted certain institutional changes, perhaps including a system which 
enabled more active participation in international trade. As of 2008, the per-capita GDP is about 25% of the 
U.S. level. It is reasonable to assume that Mainland China will continue to catch up the U.S. level, which 
will affect the global economy considering its large population. Here, I conduct a brief computation based 
on a simple model of economic growth. (See, for example, Lucas (2009), for further discussions on this 
model.) I assume Yଵ୲/Lଵ୲ ൌ Aଵ୲ and Aଵ,୲ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ gAሻAଵ୲ for the U.S., where a subscript “1” implies the 
U.S., Yଵ୲ is the total GDP, Lଵ୲ is the population, Aଵ୲ is the productivity which is also interpreted as per-
capita GDP, all of which are for year t, and gA is a constant. For Mainland China, I reflect its catch-up 
property by assuming Yଶ୲/Lଶ୲ ൌ Aଶ୲ and Aଶ,୲ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ gAሻሺAଵ୲ሻ஘ሺAଶ୲ሻଵି஘, where a subscript “2” implies 
Mainland China, Yଶ୲, Lଶ୲ and Aଶ୲ are total GDP, population, and productivity, respectively. Here, θ is a 
parameter representing the convergence speed of Mainland China to the U.S. According to this model, 
Mainland China grows faster than the U.S., and then the growth rate declines as the gap between the two 
economies shrinks. Eventually, per-capita GDPs will converge, after which the two economies grow 
together at the same rates. This description is consistent with the experience of other economies as 
illustrated in Figure 2. I further assume that the population grows at constant rates in each economy, so that 
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Lଵ,୲ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ gଵሻLଵ୲ and Lଶ,୲ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ gଶሻLଶ୲, where gଵ and gଶ are population growth rates. 
To understand the implication of this quantifiable model, I use the GDP and population data from the 
Penn World Table. When one considers the size of the economy, the market exchange rate (rather than the 
purchasing power parity) appears to be considered as a more relevant way to transform the currency. Hence, 
for Yଵ୲ and Yଶ୲, I use the GDPs under the market exchange rates. The data from 1960-2008 imply that the 
U.S. per-capita GDP growth is about 2% per year, and hence, I assume gA ൌ 0.02. Then, a parameter value 
of θ ൌ 0.02 can match the observed values and the values predicted by this model of Mainland China’s 
per-capita GDPs, for two years, 2000 and 2008. I use the recent five-year average population growth for gଵ 
and gଶ. This provides the future paths of the total GDPs which are illustrated in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Projections on Total GDPs of Mainland China and the U.S. 
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global economy of the future.5 I also expect that as Mainland China becomes a more successful economy, 
the changes in political, legal and civilian institutions will also follow, as South Korea and other countries 
experienced similarly. 
In Figure 6, North Korea falls behind in relative per-capita GDPs. Its per-capita GDP was similar to 
South Korea’s until around 1975, but after that, the gap between the two economies has increased. North 
Korea’s per-capita GDP was exceeded by Mainland China in around 1993. As of 2008, its per-capita GDP is 
only about 5% of the U.S. level. North Korea would be able to join other successful North East Asian 
economies to catch up the advanced economies with institutional changes conducted in Mainland China and 
elsewhere.6 
What sort of institutional changes should all North East Asian economies have in order to hasten the 
economic growth even further? The discussions so far emphasize an active participation in manufacturing 
exports. An improved institution would further foster private competitions across the firms so that they have 
incentives to adopt the knowledge available elsewhere. However, an important observation is that some of 
North East Asian economies have almost caught up other advanced economies. This implies that it will be 
increasingly important for North East Asian economies to produce the knowledge in order to continue their 
growth path. While it is important to strengthen the international interactions across the economies, they 
need to construct an improved system of protecting the knowledge to encourage research and development. 
This is a difficult task since the system needs a balance. On one hand, a heavier protection on inventions, 
discoveries, copyrights and other intellectual properties will result in more incentives to participate in the 
activities to produce them. On the other hand, too much protection will make it more difficult to share the 
knowledge across firms, which will distract them from improving productivity successfully. Also, the North 
East Asian economies need to build up a more active international market to trade knowledge, including 
patents, copyrights, know-how, etc. A study on protecting knowledge and building up a market to trade it 
                                                          
5 A more detailed discussion on the growth of Mainland China can be found in Luckstead, Choi and Devadoss (2010). 
6 Choi, Keam and St. Brown (2010) provide further discussions on the North Korean economy. 
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would be important. 
 
References 
Alcalá, Francisco, and Antonio Ciccone (2004), “Trade and Productivity,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
 119(2), 612-645. 
Alfaro, Laura, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Vadym Volosovych (2008), Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from 
 Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical Investigation,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2), 
 347-368 
Choi, Seung Mo, Hwagyun Kim, and Xiaohan Ma (2010), “Learning by Exports,” unpublished manuscript. 
Choi, Seung Mo, Hyung Seok Keam, and Max St. Brown (2010), “Output Convergences after Unifications 
 in Germany and in Korea,” unpublished manuscript. 
Frankel, Jeffrey A., and David Romer (1996), “Trade and Growth: An Empirical Investigation,” NBER 
 Working Paper, 5476. 
Frankel, Jeffrey A., and David Romer (1999), “Does Trade Cause Growth?”, American Economic Review, 
 89(3), 379-399. 
Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones (1999), “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per 
 Worker than Others?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 83-116. 
Hausmann, Ricardo, Jason Hwang, and Dani Rodrik (2007), “What You Export Matters,” Journal of 
 Economic Growth, 12(1), 1-25. 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (2009), “Trade and the Diffusion of the Industrial Revolution,” American Economic 
 Journal: Macroeconomics, 1(1), 1-25.   
Luckstead,  Jeffrey A., Seung Mo Choi, and Stephen Devadoss (2010), “A Decomposition of China’s 
 Productivity Growth,” unpublished manuscript. 
Parente, Stephen L., and Edward C. Prescott (2000), Barriers to Riches (Boston, MA, USA: MIT Press). 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew Warner (1995), “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration,” 
  17
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1995(1), 1-118. 
Young, Alwyn (1991), “Learning by Doing and the Dynamic Effects of International Trade,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 106(2), 369-405. 
 
